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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRACTS-ILLEGALITY-VALIDITY

OF COVENANT LIMITING USE OF FILLING

STATION PROPERTY GIVEN To PROCURE FRONTAGE CONSENT.-In

the case

of

Lain v. Rennert,l the defendant, Rennert, owned vacant property fronting

on Catalpa Avenue in Chicago for a full block between Ashland Avenue

and Clark Street. Rennert desired to use the east half of his property for
an automobile filling station. To do so he was required by city ordinance 2
to obtain frontage consents from a majority of the owners within 150
feet of the proposed location of his filling station. The consent of the
plaintiff, who owned the land facing Catalpa Avenue on the north side of
that street, opposite the defendant's land, was solicited. To procure this
consent, the defendant was asked to, and did give, a sealed covenant that
the west half of defendant's land, not used for the filling station, would
"be kept covered with grass, properly seeded and mowed, and at all
times .

.

. kept in a good and sightly condition, and that the said covenant

shall run with the land for a period of five years." This covenant was
recorded. Thereafter defendant, Rennert, leased all of his described land
to defendant, Piper, for a term of fifteen years, to be used by Piper to
1 308 Ill. App. 572, 32 N.E.(2d) 375 (1941).
2 The Municipal Code of Chicago 1939, § 127-5.
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operate a filling station to be built by Rennert on the east half of his
land. The lease was made expressly subject to the covenant to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, within one year of the date of the giving of the covenant, filed suit for injunction and damages, claiming that the property
covered by the covenant had not been covered with grass, but instead
was covered with gravel and was being used as a parking lot. The trial
court granted the relief prayed for.
The Appellate Court reversed this decision, holding, as should be expected, that although a seal in a deed makes inquiry into consideration
unnecessary, an equity court may look beyond the seal and determine
what the actual consideration was. 3
It was found that in this case the easement granted by the deed was
the consideration for which the plaintiff subsequently gave his frontage
consent to the filling station. The court agreed with the defendant that
this transaction was similar to a bargain and sale of a frontage consent
and as such was against public policy. A sale of a frontage consent is
held to be against public policy because it has the same result as a
purchase of votes at a public election. 4 Moreover, since the owner acts
in part in a public capacity, he cannot be allowed to make a profit from
his action. 5
The two precedents cited by the court could, however, have been distinguished without great difficulty. Both were proceedings to invalidate
licenses granted in reliance on frontage consents purchased for cash.
The consideration having already been paid, there was no attempt to
collect it. The fact that the consideration in the earlier cases was cash
suggests an inquiry into the type of consideration which was existent in
the instant case. No cash had been paid or promised. Perhaps failure to
keep the covenant would have been a failure of consideration, and the
consent would have become void. But this was apparently not contemplated by the parties and could only have resulted in invalidating the
license without causing financial liability for breach. A breach could
hardly cause a forfeiture of the consent in the absence of an expressed
agreement, since conditions subsequent are frowned upon by the law.
Existence of a consideration of some kind may be admitted for the
sake of argument, but it was certainly an unusual kind of consideration.
It was not intended to be either financially profitable to the plaintiff
himself or detrimental to the defendant but rather to be in the nature of
protection to the residents of the neighborhood, including the defendant,
against uses akin to nuisance which might lower the value of local real
estate. It is submitted that there should be sufficient differentiation be3 Hale v. Dressen, 73 Minn. 277, 76 N.W. 31 (1898); Way v. Union Cent. Life Ins.
Co., 61 S.C. 501, 39 S.E. 742 (1901); Williams v. Whittell, 69 App. Div. 340, 74 N.Y.S.
820 (1902); Lacey v. Hutchinson, 5 Ga. App. 865, 64 S.E. 105 (1909); Gates v. Herr,
102 Wash. 131, 172 P. 912 (1918); Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Divine, 97
Conn. 193, 116 A. 239 (1922); Branch v. Richmond Cold Storage, Inc., 146 Va. 680,
132 S.E. 848 (1926); Bandy v. Bandy, 187 S.C. 410, 197 S.E. 396 (1938).
4 Theurer v. People ex rel. Deneen, 211 Ill. 296, 71 N.E. 997 (1904).
5 People v. Griesbach, 211 Ill. 35, 71 N.E. 874 (1904).
6 Notes 4 and 5 supra.
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tween personal financial gain at the expense of local real estate values
and protection against the diminishing of those same real estate values
to enable the courts to distinguish between the two situations and to rule
differently thereon.
In view of the instant case and the precedents relied upon therein, it
would seem that public policy requires a frontage consent to be an outright gift. A review of analogous situations raises a question of the wisdom of such a requirement. A state may grant franchises upon any
terms not prohibited by its fundamental laws; it may even offer such
franchises for sale. 7 It can likewise grant licenses and subsequently extend or modify them by special law s or by general statute. 9 A municipality may likewise impose conditions and restrictions upon a license. 10
As was said in City of Hartford v. Connecticut Company:
The City, of course, could withhold its consent entirely. There can
be no doubt therefore, of its right to withhold partially or to limit
the grant."
It may also impose conditions subsequent. 12 It may subsequently alter
the terms of a franchise or a license already given. 13 A drainage district may likewise impose terms upon its consent to the use of the streets
for a drainage ditch. 14 A liquor commission may also, subsequent to the
grant of a license, further condition the grant upon the surrender of a
key to the licensed premises for purposes of inspection. 15 Local authorities may not only accept conditionally, but even modify the plans pro16
posed for street railways.
It would thus seem that a gift need not always be unrestricted, and
that a gift in part should not be deemed as a matter of law to be an unrestricted gift. The defendant in the instant case had by agreement received only a limited gift. Since he exceeded the limitations, it seems
logical that he should respond in damages for so doing. With respect
to damages suffered by the neighborhood generally, it would probably
be more practical to prevent further damage by injunction than to attempt pecuniary recovery. The removal of the detrimental influence
might substantially restore the property values to their original level.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the court has disregarded all question of a limited gift. Consideration for a frontage consent given merely
for the protection of local property is quite different from cash payment
N.Y. Laws 1890, p. 1109, c. 565, § 93.
Jackson v. Revere Sugar Refinery, 247 Mass. 483, 142 N.E. 909 (1924).
9 Fogg v. Ocean City, 74 N.J.L. 362, 65 A. 885 (1907).
10 Van de Water v. Pridham, 33 Cal. App. 252, 164 P. 1136 (1917).
11 City of Hartford v. Connecticut Co., 107 Conn. 312, 140 A. 734 (1928).
12 In re Bickerstaff, 70 Cal. 35, 11 P. 393 (1886).
13 San Antonio Traction Co. v. Altgelt, 200 U.S. 304, 26 S.Ct. 261, 50 L. Ed. 491
(1906).
14 Van de Water v. Pridham, 33 Cal. App. 252, 164 P. 1136 (1917).
15 Manchester Press Club v. State Liquor Commission, 89 N.H. 442, 200 A. 407
(1938).
16 Conn. Public Acts of 1893, p. 308.
7
8
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to an individual owner who, in effect, sells the right to damage his
neighbor's property. Public policy should take cognizance of this difference.
CORPORATIONS-REPRESENTATIVE SUIT-INTERVENTION BY ONE NOT A STocKIn Picca v. Sperry
AT TIME OF TRANSACTION COMPLAINED OF. -

HOLDER

Corporation,' the Federal District Court for the Southern District of New
York, held that Rule 23(b) 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which requires in part that a stockholder bringing a representative action
allege ownership of stock at the time of the transactions complained of,
applied also to a stockholder seeking to intervene. In that action, one
stockholder brought a representative action against the officers and directors for alleged wrongs to the corporation. The parties sought approval
of a proposed settlement.a At the hearing, other stockholders opposing
the settlement petitioned the court for leave to intervene on the ground
that the plaintiff, who had indicated his willingness to settle, could not
adequately protect their interests. The intervening petition did not comply with Rule 23(b). The court, observing that other stockholders might
be able to meet the requirements of the rule, held it was not only applicable to petitioners but also governed the discretion vested in him
by another rule,4 and denied the petition.
It is undoubtedly true that a stockholder initiating a representative
suit in the federal courts in addition to jurisdictional facts, such as
diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional amount, must also show compliance with the rule in question.5
If he begins his proceeding in an appropriate state court, however,
and if he possesses a right of action cognizable in the state court his
1 36 F. Supp. 1006 (1941). Not cited in the instant case, but illustrating parallel
problems, are Continental & Commercial Trust & Savings Bank v. Allis-Chalmers
Co., 200 F. 600 (1912); Guaranty Trust Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 15
F. (2d) 434 (1925).
2 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. Rule 23(b) provides as follows: "Secondary
Action by Shareholders. In an action brought to enforce a secondary right on the
part of one or more shareholders in an association, incorporated or unincorporated,
because the association refuses to enforce rights which may properly be asserted
by it, the complaint shall be verified by oath and shall aver (1) that the plaintiff
was a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that
his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of law and (2) that the action
is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the United States jurisdiction of any
action of which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction. The complaint shall also
set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to secure from the managing
directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the shareholders such action as he
desires, and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the reasons for not
making such effort."
3 The court denied approval of the proposed settlement, which had previously
been approved by an arbitrator, because of doubt whether all the facts had been
revealed to the court and whether the agreed set of facts upon which the arbitrator had approved the settlement was complete.
4 See footnote 16, infra.
5 Howes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450, 26 L.Ed. 827 (1881); Summers v.
Hearst, 23 F. Supp. 986 (1938).
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suit ought not to be dismissed for his inability to comply with the rule in
question when the case is subsequently removed to some federal court
at the instance of the defendants. 6 As to him, the rule is inoperative.
Whether or not the same principles should govern one seeking to intervene depends upon whether Rule 23(b) is jurisdictional, substantive, or
procedural. Unlike an initial plaintiff, an intervenor in a representative
action need not allege independent federal jurisdictional grounds. 7 The
United States Supreme Court has held that the allegation of stock ownership at the time of the transactions complained of is not a jurisdictional
requirement.8
The fact that the initial plaintiff utilized the federal rather than the
state courts would change the rights of the person seeking to intervene
if Rule 23(b) establishes substantive rights. Under the language of the
rule one would not be entitled to assert any claim unless his ownership
existed at the time the alleged wrongs were committed. The holder of
subsequently acquired shares could neither initiate action, nor justifiably
ask permission to join in a pending suit. So far as the state courts are
concerned, the rulings vary. In some states a stockholder may intervene
regardless of when he acquired holdings. (In this category is the State
of New York, where the corporation involved in the instant proceeding
was organised. 9 ) In other states, a stockholder has no such right. 0 It
would seem, according to Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins," that
the substantive rights of a stockholder in a domestic corporation should
be no broader in the federal courts than in a state court. If Rule 23(b)
6 Earle v. Seattle, 1 S.&E. Ry., 56 F. 909 (Washington 1893); Evans v. Union
Pacific Ry. Co., 58 F. 497 (Colorado 1893); See, however, Venner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 209 U.S. 24, 28 S.Ct. 328, 52 L.Ed. 666 (1908) in which a stockholder's

action, begun in a state court and removed to a federal court at the instance of
the defendants, was dismissed for failure of plantiff to allege ownership of stock
at the time of the transactions complained of and to meet the other requirements
now contained in Rule 23(b) (footnote 2, supra). The ruling of the lower federal
court dismissing the action was not raised on appeal. The Supreme Court merely
held that the lower court had jurisdiction to hear the case. See also: Jacobson v.
General Motors Corp., 22 F. Supp. 255 (New York 1938), and Hand v. Kansas City
Southern Ry. Co., 55 F.(2d) 712 (New York 1931). In the latter case, it is said
with respect to actions removed to the federal courts, (p. 714): ". . . that a stockholder must have been such at the time of the commission of the wrongs complained of and that the suit is not collusive, has no application to cases depending
upon a federal question. It applies only to cases where jurisdiction is based upon
diversity of citizenship."
7 Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 5 S.Ct. 1163, 29 L.Ed. 329 (1885); Supreme
Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 41 S.Ct. 338, 65 L.Ed. 673 (1921).
8 Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Adams, 180 U.S. 28, 21 S.Ct. 251, 45 L.Ed.
410 (1901); Venner v. Great Northern Railway Company, footnote 6 supra;
Hand v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company, footnote 6 supra; Ainscow v.
Sanitary Co. of America, Del. Ch., 180 A. 614 (1935).
9 Pollitz v. Gould, 202 N.Y. 11, 94 N.E. 1088, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 988, Ann. Cas.
1912D 1098 (1911). Also in this category are: Alabama, Idaho, Illinois, Maine,
Michigan, Montana, and New Hampshire-14 C.J. 936.
10 Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, and Pennsylvania cases are cited in 14
C.J. 937, footnote 58.
11 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938).
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is substantive, it indicates that the stockholders rights should be more
narrowly construed in the federal courts than in the state court.
12
The present rule embodies the language of two former equity rules,
3
which in turn codified the effect of the decision in Hawes v. Oakland.'
Rule 23(b) can be only a rule of procedure regulating the manner of
utilizing the federal judicial machinery because the sole authority for it
rests in the grant of power to the United States Supreme Court to adopt
rules regulating procedure. This power contains the express prohibition
that: "Said rules shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights of any litigant."' 4 When one remembers that the original
purpose of the rule was to prevent collusive suits by making inoperative
a transfer of stock to a non-resident solely for the purpose of enabling
him to comply with jurisdictional requirements, it becomes fairly apparent that the rule was intended as a mere procedural device. 15 Its application in the instant proceeding elevates it into a rule of substance in
apparent disregard of the express prohibition above referred to.
The court in the instant case apparently thought that the right of intervention was subject to judicial discretion under Rule 24(b). 16 The
reason assigned for seeking to intervene was the inability of the initial
plaintiff adequately to represent the other members of the class. It is
submitted that this reason comes clearly within Rule 24(a), clause 2,
justifying intervention as a matter of right.-- It is likely that the holding
in the instant case will not be reviewed for some time. Meanwhile other
federal district courts would be warranted in scrutinising the problem
carefully before following the ruling of the New York Federal court.

R. K.

MERRILL

INJUNCTIONS-MEANING OF THE TERM "LABOR DispuTE"-NECESsn'y OF
FUNCTIONAL EMPLOYMENT.-Opera on Tour, Inc., is engaged in the business of presenting public performances of grand opera
at popular prices. Musicians are not, and never have been, employed
by the opera company, its music being mechanically reproduced from
RELATIONSHIP OF

12 Equity Rule 94 was promulgated in 1882. It was replaced by Equity Rule 27 in
1912, which varied slightly from Equity Rule 94. Rule 23(b) now in force contains
all the requirements of these equity rules. (See footnote 2 supra)-. It was adopted
as a rule of civil procedure for the District Courts of the United States pursuant
to Act of June 19, 1934, Ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, effective September 16, 1938. See 4
Md. L.R. 380.
13 104 U.S. 450, 26 L.Ed. 827 (1881).
14 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 723(b).
15 Hawes v. Oakland, footnote 13 supra; 21 Har. L.R. 195.
16 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723(c):
"(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon
timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when
a statute of the United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when
an applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or
fact in common. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the
original parties."
17 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723(c): "(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely
application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: . . . (2) when
the representation of the applicant's interest by existing parties is or may be
inadequate and the applicant is or may be bound by a judgment in the action."
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records, but the employment of stagehands is necessary to the conduct
of such business. The Muscians' Union, determined to compel the opera
company to abandon the use of mechanical devices which causes unemployment of its members, seized upon an alliance with the Stagehands'
Union,' and induced the latter union to order its members to cease rendering services to the opera company. The company sued to restrain the
two unions from directing or inducing stagehands to cease rendering
services to it. The New York Court of Appeals held that the anti-injunction act 2 does not apply where the demands of labor are not generated
by some interest connected with "employment, ' 3 and that under such
circumstances it is not a lawful labor objective "for a union to insist
that machinery be discarded in order that manual labor may take its
place and thus secure additional apportunity of employment." ' 4 The issuance of an injunction was affirmed. 5
The decision is based on the fundamental assumption that it is not
every interest of labor which can serve as a foundation for a "labor dis1 Both unions are members of the American Federation of Labor. They had
agreed that they might call upon one another for "moral support" in certain specified contingencies, and that in some cases co-operation might go beyond "moral
support."
2 N.Y. Civil Practice Act, Section 876-a, denying jurisdiction to issue "any
restraining order or a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute." Sub-section 10(c) defines the term "labor dispute" as follows: "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, or concerning employment relations, or any
other controversy arising out of the respective interests of employer and employee, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the relation of employer and employee."
3 Opera On Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 34 N.E. (2d) 349 (N.Y., 1941).
4 Ibid., p. 353. The theory being that such a demand "has no reasonable connection with wages, hours, health, safety, the right of collective bargaining, or any
other condition of employment or for the protection of labor from abuses,"
(p. 352) and is therefore unjustified.
5 Reversing 258 App. Div. 516, 17 N.Y.S. (2d) 144 (1940) and affirming 170
Misc. 272, 10 N.Y.S. (2d) 83 (1939). "The Musicians' Union, 'its officers, members,
agents, servants, employees, representatives and attorneys' and the Stagehands'
Union and its 'officers, members, agents, servants, employees, representatives
and attorneys' have been permanently enjoined and restrained, among other
things, 'from interfering with plaintiff's employees and from directing, ordering,
instructing or advising any person or persons to cease performing or not to perform services for the plaintiff, Opera On Tour, Inc., and from inducing, causing
or procuring in any manner or by any device whatsover, any person or persons
or organization, association, corporation or group of which any of plaintiff's employees may be a member or may be affiliated with or any group or groups of
plaintiff's employees to leave or not to enter the plaintiff's employ or to cease
performing services for plaintiff or to cause or induce its members or others to
leave or not to enter the plaintiff's employ or to cease performing services for
the plaintiff on the ground that, or for the reason that, the plaintiff, Opera On
Tour, Inc., uses recorded or transcribed or mechanically reproduced music in
connection with its performances' . . . "(Italics Supplied). It is submitted that
the court's insistance that "there is in the case at bar no denial of the right to
strike" cannot be taken at face value.
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pute"; that only those interests springing from a somewhere existent relationship of employment, with which the parties to an economic dispute are in some way connected, can lie behind a "labor dispute." 6 Although it has not been universally accepted, 7 the theory seems sound
enough. s The employment relationship has created the problems which
have led society to grant to one party certain weapons which it ordinarily would not have obtained; remove the relationship, or some connection therewith, and it should follow that such weapons be withdrawn. The
New York court has heretofore taken this approach in the "one-man
business" cases, 9 but the instant case sets up a new line of demarcation based on a functional, "type of business" test, inasmuch as the
actual employment of stagehands must be explained away.
The stagehands may lawfully picket the place of business of one who
employs stagehands in order to compel the employment of more stagehands;' 0 and, in order to obtain recognition as bargaining agent, the
stagehands' union may picket such an employer, notwithstanding the
fact that his employees are not members of the union and that they are
satisfied with their employment relations.'1 A carpenters' union, in its
efforts to secure a closed shop in a lumber mill, may lawfully refuse to
6 Thompson v. Boekhout, 273 N.Y. 390, 7 N.E. (2d) 674 (1937); Wohl v. Bakery
and Pastry Drivers and Helpers, 284 N.Y. 784, 31 N.E.(2d) 765 (1940); Luft v.
Flove, 270 N.Y. 640, 1 N.E. (2d) 369 (1936).
7 Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 222 Wis. 383, 268 N.W. 270 (1936); Milk
Wagon Drivers' Union v. Lake Valley Farm Products, Inc., 311 U.S. 91, 61 S.Ct.
122, 85 L.Ed. 91 (1940); Rohde v. Dighton, 27 F. Supp. 149 (1939).
8 It is difficult to conceive of labor law, "labor disputes" and anti-injunction

statutes in a society which does not know the employment relationship.
9 E.g. Where the plaintiff employs no one and is not in "unity of interest" with
persons who do employ. Thompson v. Boekhout, 273 N.Y. 390, 7 N.E.(2d) 674
(1937); Wohl v. Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers, 284 N.Y. 784, 31 N.E. (2d)
765 (1940); Luft v. Flove, 270 N.Y. 640, 1 N.E.(2d) 369 (1936). Compare foregoing
with Baillis v. Fuchs, 283 N.Y. 133, 27 N.E.(2d) 812 (1940), where there was a
willingness to re-employ upon pre-strike terms; and Boro Park Sanitary Live
Poultry Market, Inc. v. Heller, 280 N.Y. 481, 21 N.E.(2d) 687 (1939), where the
corporate entity theory operated to furnish the employment relationship.
10 J.H.&S. Theatres, Inc. v. Fay, 260 N.Y. 315, 183 N.E. 509 (1932). Also see
Scott-Stafford Opera House Co. v. Mineaoplis Musician's Ass'n, 118 Minn. 410, 136
N.W. 1092 (1912). Cf. Haverhill Strand Theater v. Gillen, 229 Mass. 413, 118 N.E.
671 (1918). It does not follow that they could lawfully insist upon the employment
of more workmen of just any character. Take, for example, the case of musicians,
employed by a radio studio, insisting upon the employment of stagehands in the
studio. Sometimes stagehands and musicians are fellow workmen engaged in the
same trade; sometimes they are not. The instant case lays the test on a functional basis, indicating that labor canot lawfully demand that an employer change
the very nature of his business. If the Illinois court had left its decision in
Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc. v. Milk Wagon Drivers' Union of Chicago, 371 IMI.
377, 21 N.E.(2d) 308 (1939), to stand for this proposition it could have avoided
turning, in Swing v. American Federation of Labor, 372 Ill.91, 22 N.E.(2d) 857
(1939), to the employer-employee test.
11 May's Furs and Ready to Wear, Inc. v. Bauer, 282 N.Y. 331, 26 N.E.(2d)
279 (1940); Stillwell Theatre v. Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63 (1932). In these
cases the unions' demands related to the employment of workmen who performed
functions required by the nature of the employer's business.
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allow its members to work for contractors who use the non-union product
of such mill, 12 and where a manufacturer refuses to unionize his plant
the union may peacefully picket at the retail outlet in order to persuade
the consumer not to purchase the non-union product. 13 In all of these
cases the labor activity complained of was being conducted by workmen
in a given trade or industry against an employer whose business called
for the employment of such workmen, or against one in unity of interest
with the employer. It can hardly be thought that the legislature intended
to permit labor unions to compel an employer to abandon one business
and enter another. Once it is agreed that conducting opera sans
musicians is one type of business while operating with musicians is another 14 it would seem clear that the instant case is sound, for when
viewed in the functional aspect it does not stand for the proposition that
it is inevitably an unlawful labor objective "for a union to insist that
machinery be discarded in order that manual labor may take its place
and thus secure additional opportunity of employment.' 15
D. S. MORRIS
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LEAsES AND AGREEMENTS-WHETHER EXPRESSLY
BASING RENTAL ON A PERCENTAGE OF SALES MADE FROM THE LEASED PRopERTY RAISES AN IMPLIED COVENANT NOT To DIVERT SUCH SALES TO OTHER
LAND.-"What is implied in an express contract is as much a part of it

as what is expressed."' Interesting on this point is Seggebruch v. Sto.sor2 recently decided by the Appellate Court of Illinois. The defendant
12 Bossert v. Dhuy, 221 N.Y. 342, 117 N.E. 582 (1917). Here, not only does the
nature of the contractor's business call for the employment of carpenters, but
the contractor is in unity of interest with one who is engaged in a dispute arising
out of the employment of carpenters. Cf. Auburn Draying Co. v. Wardell, 227 N.Y.
1, 124 N.E. 97 (1919). where threatened action, by crafts different from that to
which the workers of the objectionable employer belonged, was held to be unlawful-thus breaking the ground for the development of the principle underlying
the instant case that workmen cannot justify interference with business on the
sole ground that those they seek to aid are also workmen. It appears that assistance may only go to those engaged in the same trade or industry and that the
functional nature of the employer's business will determine whether the common
color exists.
'3 Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E. (2d) 910 (1937), where the retailer is in unity of interest with one whose business requires an employment

relation with the type of workmen who are protesting.
14 That it is, note the difference in admission price, with the consequent difference in class and number of patrons, and the type of. community in which produced; but the true distinction is functional, bearing some analogy to a comparison of the motion picture with the legitimate stage.
15 As indicated by the court at page 354: "There is in the case at bar no question raised concerning the dismissal of any employee on account of the introduction of machinery." If unions may strike against men [National Protective
Ass'n of Steam Fitters and Helpers v. Cumming, 170 N.Y. 315, 63 N.E. 369 (1902)],
it should follow that they may strike against machines, so long as the functional
test is met. Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N.J. Eq. 101, 30 A. 881 (1894); Bayer
v. Brotherhood of Painters, 108 N.J. Eq. 257, 154 A. 759 (1931). Cf. Hopkins v.
Oxley Stave Co., 83 F. 912 (1897).
1 Bishop on Contracts (2d Ed.) 95, § 241 (1907).
2 309 Ii1. App. 385, 33 N.E.(2d) 159 (1941).
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here rented a gasoline station from the plaintiff at a rental based on a
percentage of the gross sales. While the lease was still in force the defendant acquired a lot adjoining the plaintiff's and erected another gasoline station on it. The amount of the gasoline sold upon the plaintiff's
property diminished until the rent was reduced to a nominal sum. The
plaintiff brought suit to recover a reasonable rental for the premises
and to have the lease set aside. The trial court granted the relief asked
for and the Appellate Court affirmed its decree. In effect, the court said
that while there was no express promise in the lease, nevertheless it
was clearly implied that defendant was to use reasonable diligence in
operating plaintiff's station.
A case exactly in point is Cissna Loan Company v. Baron.3 Here the
plaintiff operated a department store business in his own building. The
defendant bought the business and leased the building from the plaintiff. The rent was to be based upon a percentage of the gross sales. The
defendant operated the business for some time and paid the rent as
agreed in the lease. One day the defendant moved two large departments from the plaintiff's building into an adjoining store. Plaintiff brought suit claiming that the sales made next door should be included in the computation of rent owed to the plaintiff. The court held
that the defendant, having no right to move the two departments into an
adjoining building, must include the receipts from these departments in
the computation of gross sales.
4
Other cases on this point are Selber Bros. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores;
5
Spring Brook Ry. Company v. Lehigh Coal and Navigation Company;
Sinclair Refining Company v. Davis.6
It is clear that there is not much controversy concerning this point.
All the cases are in accord in holding that the law, a silent factor in
7
every contract, will not allow one to break implied covenants.
This is the first time that a case involving a filling station lease has
arisen on this point in Illinois. However, the Illinois Supreme Court has
consistently held that, where rent is to be based on a percentage of the
Income from the property leased, the lessee is bound to use reasonable
diligence in his use of the property so as to obtain the most revenue for
himself and for his lessor. 8
There can be no doubt that the rights of the lessor demand that the
lessee be precluded from wilfully injuring the lessor. If an implied covenant were not read into the written contract, the lessee might be without
a remedy, and the lessor would be able to continue his unconscionable
conduct unhindered. Such a result would be contrary to established principles of justice.
The equities in favor of the lessor in the case at hand are stronger
4 194 La. 654, 194 So. 579 (1940).
6 47 Ga. App. 601, 171 S.E. 150 (1933).
182 Pa. 500, 37 A. 525 (1897).
7 Long v. Straus, 107 Ind. 94, 95, 6 N.E. 123, 7 N.E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 87 (1886).
s Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263 Ill. 518, 105 N.E. 308 (1914); Stoddard v. Ill.
Imp. & Ballast Co., 275 Ill. 199, 113 N.E. 913 (1916).
3 149 Wash. 386, 270 P. 1022 (1928).
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than those of the lessor in the Cissna Case. In the Cissna Case, the lessee
was forced to move two of the departments because he needed the space
for an office. Nevertheless, the Court held him liable because the implied
covenant in the lease forbade such actions regardless of necessity. In
the instant case the trial judge characterized the lessee's actions as
"wilful and deliberate and done purely with the intention of injuring
the lessor." 9 As the trial judge said in the Stosor case, the law will not
allow such an evident wrong to be committed without finding some

remedy.
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"SURFACE

ONLY."-In Shell Oil Co., Inc. v. Manley Oil Corporation,' complainant
was an assignee of an oil and gas lease given by persons claiming title
through the grantor in a certain warranty deed to the minerals underlying the land, other than coal. The warranty deed upon which the assignee's right depended purported to convey the "surface only" and such
deed was expressly made subject to a prior deed conveying coal rights.
Defendant, on the other hand, claimed a right to drill under an oil and
gas lease derived under the grantee in the warranty deed, on the theory
that the warranty deed passed to the grantee not only the bare surface
of the land but also all minerals underlying the land other than coal.
Complainant brought a bill to enjoin the defendant from drilling for oil
and gas, relying on the contention that the words "surface only" meant
only the superficial part of land, exclusive of minerals, and that an estate in fee to all minerals, other than coal, remained in the grantor.
The District Court, Eastern District Illinois, denied injunction, holding
that under Illinois law, a deed which purported to convey the "surface
only" of land, and which was expressly made subject to a prior deed
conveying coal rights, was construable under the evidence as a complete grant of the estate and rights of the grantor including all mineral
rights other than the coal rights. 2 The words "surface only," as used in
9 309 IlI. App. 385, 33 N.E.(2d) 159 (1941).
1 37 F. Supp. 289 (1941).
2 Relying principally upon Ramage v. South Penn Oil Co., 94 W.Va. 81, 118
S.-E. 162, 31 A.L.R. 1509 (1923) wherein "all that surface of a tract" subject to a
right of ingress and egress for drilling oil and gas wells thereon was held to
convey not only the surface but also all minerals other than oil and gas. The
Ramage case, supra, overruled Williams v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W.Va. 181, 43
S.E. 214 (1903) which held that ". . . the word 'surface' has a definite certain
meaning; . . . it is that portion of the land which is or may be used for
agricultural purposes, ...
" See also: Bogart v. Amanda Consolidated Gold
Mining Co., 32 Colo. 32, 74 P. 882 (1903); Myher v. Myher, 224 Mo. 631, 123 S.W. 806
(1909). Also the case of Gearhart v. McAlester Fuel Co., 199 Ark. 981, 136 S.W. (2d)
679 (1940) held that ". . . the word 'surface', as used in the conveyances above
mentioned, means something more than that portion of the land which is or may
be used for agricultural purposes. It means not only the actual top of the ground,
but also all the earth substructure, except the coal therein, the right to mine and
recover which was granted in the lease." For a discussion of the term "surface"
as used in transfers of land see 31 A.L.R. 1530.
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the warranty deed in question, presented an ambiguity in view of the
fact that the grant was made subject to a prior deed of the underlying
coal, leaving in doubt whether the grantor wished to dispose of the remainder of his interest in the property, or merely to pass the top soil,
retaining all sub-surface rights other than the right to mine coal. Evidence, therefore, was admitted of a custom 3 in Franklin County, extant
at the time of making the deed in the instant case and prior to the discovery of oil, whereby the words "surface only" were used in transfers
of land already subject to prior grants of coal rights where the intention
was to pass title to all minerals underlying the land other than coal.
Such proof of custom was relied on to show a similar intention on the
part of the grantor in the instant case. The court in reaching its decision
relied upon the rule that ambiguity in a deed should be4 resolved most
strongly against the grantor and in favor of the grantee.
The term "surface," when used as the subject of a conveyance, is not
a rigid one, capable of a definition of universal application, but is susceptible of limitation according to the intention of the parties using it. 5
The use of the additional word "only" following the word "surface" in the
deed provides only further criteria in arriving at that intention, and when
coupled with the evidence of the custom, tends to bear out the interpretation given to the grant. Particularly is this so where the grantor, to
prevent a breach of warranty, placed a specific provision in the deed
subjecting the same to the earlier grant of coal rights. Such provision
should be treated as excluding the possibility of any other reservation
having been made.
The decision should not affect the principle, well established in fllinois, that each specific mineral underlying land may be severed from
the remainder of the land and conveyed or reserved as a separate estate in fee where such is accomplished by clear and unambiguous
language in the conveyance, 6 but it does serve as a warning that
a grantor, under similar circumstances, desiring to reserve specific minerals, should use express language to accomplish his purpose.
A. W. FORBES
MORTGAGES -

REDEMPTION

-

WHETHER

JUNIOR

MORTGAGEE

FRAUDULENT-

FROM THE FIRsT MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS MAY
REDEEM AFTER REDEMPTION PERIOD HAS ExPIRED BY PAYING THE AMOUNT
OF THE SUCCESSFUL BID.-The element of fraud has caused the Illinois
Supreme Court, in Callner v. Greenberg,' to elaborate upon the traditional distinction between equitable redemption and statutory redemption. In
a foreclosure proceeding by a senior mortgagee, the junior mortgagee
LY OMITTED

3 Where language used in a deed is ambiguous, extrinsic evidence is admissible
to show the intention of the parties.
4 Tiffany, Real Property (3rd Ed.) § 978, cases cited therein.
5 See footnote 2.
6 Kinder v. LaSalle County Coal Co., 301 Ill. 362, 133 N.E. 772 (1921); Catlin
Coal Co. v. Lloyd, 176 Ill. 275, 52 N.E. 144 (1898).
212, 33 N.E. (2d) 437 (1941).
1 376 Ill.
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was made a party as an "unknown owner," although his name and address were known, and service of summons was had by publication only.
At the ensuing foreclosure sale in 1933, the property, security for a debt of
$50,000, was sold for $8,500. The junior mortgagee, learning of these
proceedings in 1937, shortly thereafter filed suit to redeem, tendering
the $8,500 bid at the sale, plus interest. A motion to dismiss for want of
2
equity was sustained by the trial court. The Appellate Court affirmed,
applying the maxim that, "he who seeks equity must do equity," and
indicated that, in order to redeem in equity, the junior mortgagee must
tender the full amount of the first mortgage debt. The Illinois Supreme
Court, however, reversed and remanded with directions to overrule the
motion, deciding that the junior mortgagee was, under these circumstances, entitled to statutory redemption, i.e., to redeem by tendering
the amount bid at the sale; also holding that to require the junior mortgagee to pay the full amount of the senior mortgage would be to permit
the parties guilty of fraud to force an election most beneficial to their
interests.
Equitable redemption and statutory redemption are fundamentally different. A junior mortgagee has an absolute right to redeem, founded
upon equitable principles and independent of statute,3 even if he has not
been made a party or has been improperly made a party to the senior
foreclosure proceedings. When so doing, however, he must pay the full
amount secured by the senior mortgagee. 4 The right of statutory redemption, 5 although it usually can be exercised only within the periods of
time and in the manner prescribed by the statute, requires a junior
mortgagee to tender only the amount bid at the senior mortgage fore304 IMI. App. 501, 26 N.E. (2d) 675 (1940).
3 Steinkemeyer v. Gillespie, 82 Ill. 253 (1876); Wiley, Banks & Co. v. Ewing, 47
Ala. 418 (1872); Frink v. Murphy, 21 Cal. 108, 81 Am. Dec. 149 (1862); Goodman v.
White, 26 Conn. 317 (1857); Anson v. Anson, 20 Iowa 55, 89 Am. Dec. 514 (1865);
Johnson v. Hosford, 110 Ind. 572, 10 N.E. 407 (1887); J. I. Case Threshing Mach.
Co. v. Mitchell, 74 Mich. 679, 42 N.W. 151 (1889); Cassidy v. Wallace, 102 Mo. 575,
15 S.W. 138 (1891); Cram v. Cottrell, 48 Neb. 646, 67 N.W. 452, 58 Am. St. Rep. 714
(1896); Moulton v. Cornish, 138 N.Y. 133, 33 N.E. 842, 20 L.R.A. 370 (1893); Horr
v. Herrington, 22 Okla. 590, 98 P. 443, 132 Am. St. Rep. 648, 20 L.R.A. (N.S.) 47
(1908); Hoppin v. Doty, 22 Wis. 621 (1868); Black v. Manhattan Trust Co., 213 F.
692 (1914).
4 A person who is entitled to redeem from the sale under foreclosure, to which
he was not a party, must pay the full amount of the mortgage lien, though the
land may have sold for a less sum. Dougherty v. Kubat, 67 Neb. 269, 93 N.W. 317
(1903). There being a clear distinction between a statutory redemption which is
from the sale and not from the mortgage and an equitable redemption established
by the court, in which case the redemption is from the mortgage, the redemptioner in the latter case must follow the technical rules of equity and pay all that
is due under the mortgage, before he is entitled to redeem and receive a conveyance of the property. Machold v. Farman, 20 Idaho 80, 117 P. 408 (1911). Where
statutory right of redemption was waived, purchaser at junior mortgage foreclosure seeking redemption in equity from senior mortgagee was required to
tender or pay whole mortgage debt. Smith v. Simpson, 129 Ark. 275, 195 S.W.
1067 (1917).
5 Ill. Rev. Stat., 1939, Ch. 77, §§ 18, 20.
2
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closure sale. 6 These two methods have long been recognized to be law in
7
Illinois.
The court, in the case at hand, allows statutory redemption on the
ground that fraud .vas practiced upon the junior mortgagee by the filing
of an affidavit falsely alleging that the holder of such mortgage was
unknown. It was regarded as fraud because ". . . the holder of a junior
mortgage has substantially different rights when he is a party to the
foreclosure of a senior mortgage and when he is not. In the one instance
he may redeem for the amount bid at the sale; in the other he is required
to pay the full amount of the first mortgage." 8 Whether one not a party
to the foreclosure proceeding has a right of statutory redemption within
the prescribed period is a question upon which the Illinois law is not
entirely clear. The point has never been directly raised, although
Heinroth v. Frost9 held that a junior mortgagee's right to redeem within
the statutory period, under section 18 or section 20 of the chapter on
6 A junior mortgagee who is a party to a suit to foreclose a senior mortgage
may redeem from a foreclosure sale by paying the amount for which the property
was sold, even though less than the amount of the senior mortgage. Froelich v.
Swafford, 33 S.D. 142, 144 N.W. 925 (1914).
7 "When the owners of the equity of redemption come into court and seek to
redeem, the application is not only in form but in substance, to redeem from the
mortgage and not from the sale under the mortgage. They are bound by the
mortgage and not by the sale, to which they were strangers, by reason of their
not having been made parties to the proceedings of foreclosure." Bradley V.
Snyder, 14 Ill.
263, 266 (1853).
"In that case [Bradley v. Snyder], certain grantees of the mortgaged premises
who were not made parties to the bill of foreclosure, filed a bill to redeem on
payment of the amount bid at the sale. They were required first to do equity,
and discharge the prior mortgage debt. They were not exercising a strictly
statutory right." Seligman v. Laubheimer, 58 Ill. 124, 126 (1871).
"The distinction must be kept in mind between a statutory redemption, which
is from the sale and not from the mortgage, and the equitable redemption established by the courts, in which the redemption is from the mortgage and not from
any sale, and out of which springs the rule that the redemptor must do equity
and pay all that is due under the mortgage, which may exceed the amount of the
sale, and which may, in some cases, include not only the debt and interest, but
taxes, repairs and betterments made and paid by a mortgagee who has entered
for condition broken (2 Jones on Mortgages [4th ed.] § 1115), and in reduction of
which such mortgagee in possession may, in most cases, be required to account
for rents and profits of the premises actually received or that could have been
received by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence." Rodman v. Quick, 211
111. 546, 554, 71 N.E. 1087, 1090 (1904).
"The right of redemption from sale on judgment or decree of foreclosure is
purely statutory, and it cannot be exercised except within the periods of time and
in the manner substantially as pointed out in the statute." Chicago Savings Bank
v. Coleman, 283 II. 611, 613, 119 N.E. 587, 588 (1918). See also: Hyman v. Bogue,
135 Ill.9, 26 N.E. 40 (1890); Ogle v. Koerner, 140 fI1. 170, 29 N.E. 563 (1892);
Morgan v. Carson, 214 Ill. App. 569 (1919); Hamalle v. Kimmel, 224 Inl.App. 9
(1922); Odell v. Levy, 307 Ill. 277, 138 N.E. 608 (1923); Hall v. American Bankers'
Ins. Co., 315 Ill. 252, 146 N.E. 137 (1925); Schaefer v. Dippel, 250 Ill. App. 184
(1928); Mulholland v. Landise, 284 Ill. App. 237, 1 N.E.(2d) 255 (1936); Smith v.
Toman, 368 Ill. 414, 14 N.E.(2d) 478 (1938).
8 Callner v. Greenberg, 376 Ill.
212, 216, 33 N.E.(2d) 437, 439 (1941).
9 250 III. 102, 95 N.E. 65 (1911).
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judgments' 0 was unaffected by the fact that he was made a party to the
senior mortgage foreclosure as "unknown owner." This situation parallels that in the instant case.
The authorities relied upon in the instant case do not support the position taken,1 ' moreover, the language of the statute would indicate a contrary intention, 12 recognizing as it does a right in the junior mortgagee to
effect a statutory redemption whether he is made a party or not. In addition, all the Illinois cases cited by the court, permitting a statutory
redemption after the expiration of the statutory period, differ from the
instant case in two ways: First, the plaintiffs were parties to, and were
bound by, the foreclosure proceeding, and hence, unless they were
granted relief against fraud by permitting redemption after the expiration of the statutory period, their interests in the premises would be
lost forever; and second, in each case the plaintiffs relied upon representations of the purchaser at the foreclosure sale that redemption
could be made after the expiration of the statutory period.'8 Further,
10 Footnote 5, supra.

11 Rodman v. Quick, 211 Ill. 546, 71 N.E. 1087 (1904) contains no language supporting the principal case. No notice of foreclosure was given to the plaintiff and
he filed a bill to redeem. The court simply drew the distinction between statutory
and equitable redemption and held that the plaintiff should pay the amount of the
debt in order to redeem. See footnote 7, supra. In a case where the facts were
similar except that the party who was left out was the grantee of the mortgagor,
the instant court apparently relied upon the following language: "Although the
grantee of the mortgagor, who is not a party, is not affected, yet his interest,
which remains the same, is only a right to redeem. By the foreclosure and sale
and the master's deed thereunder [Italics supplied.], the legal title becomes
vested in the grantee in such deed, and leaves nothing in the mortgagor, or his
grantees, who are not parties to the proceeding, except the right to redeem in
equity. Inasmuch as the interest of the grantee of the mortgagor, who is not made
a party to the foreclosure, is merely a right of redemption, the right which he
has is an equitable one, and must be asserted in a court of equity." Walker v.
Warner, 179 Ill. 16, 24, 53 N.E. 594 (1899). [This passage appears with changed
language in 53 N.E. at p. 597.] That court merely says that after the master's
deed issued there was nothing left for plaintiff except to redeem in equity. It does
not say that before the expiration of twelve months there is not a right to redeem
under the statute.
12 "Any defendant, his heirs, executors, administrators, assigns, or any person
interested in the premises, through or under the defendant, may . . . within
twelve months from said sale, redeem the real estate so sold ....
[Ital. supplied.]
Ill. Rev. Stat., 1939, Ch. 77, § 18.
"If

such redemption is not made, any decree or judgment creditor . . . may,

after the expiration of twelve months and within fifteen months after the sale . . .
redeem the premises in the following manner ....
[Ital. supplied.] Ill. Rev. Stat.,
1939, Ch. 77, § 20.
13 In Ogden v. Stevens, 241 Ill. 556, 89 N.E. 741, 132 Am. St. Rep. 237 (1909)
the defendant frequently promised the plaintiff to accept money and permit a
redemption both before and after the master's deed was issued to defendant.
Plaintiff's predecessor had been a party to the foreclosure proceeding. Plaintiff
also made repeated efforts to close the transaction and the defendant was either
not at home or was too ill to attend to business affairs. In Palmer v. Douglas,
107 Ill. 204 (1883), the purchaser at the foreclosure sale was the family physician
and confidential adviser of the plaintiff, an illiterate old man, and he repeatedly
assured the latter that he would permit redemption of the property. Woodworth
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most of the other authorities used by the court to support the view
that a junior mortgagee may be given the right to redeem from a first
mortgage sale after the expiration of the period of redemption where
he was not served with process are cases in which redemption in
equity was allowed. 14 The two other cases cited for this proposition also
may be distinguished and are not actually authority for the court's contention. 15
Apparently the instant case is out of line with precedent. It lacks
authority for three of its fundamental premises: (1) that one not a party
to the foreclosure is not entitled to statutory redemption; (2) that making
the junior mortgagee an "unknown party" through a false affidavit is
such fraud as to justify a statutory redemption after the expiration
of the statutory period; (3) that a junior mortgagee may have statutory
redemption after the statutory period has elapsed where he was not
served with process in the senior mortgage foreclosure proceeding. Yet
the decision, based on the fraud admitted by the motion to dismiss, is
not without logic and the result is equitable. It is true that a junior mortgagee, not served with process, is protected by his right of redemption
in equity. It is also true that one not a party to the foreclosure may
exercise a statutory right of redemption within the statuory period.
Nevertheless, where the statutory period has in fact passed before the
junior mortgagee had knowledge of the forclosure sale, as was the
case here, and where this was caused by the defendants' falsely describing such junior mortgagee as an "unknown owner", it cannot be denied
that his rights were adversely affected as a result of the defendants'
conduct. As a result of this conduct, the junior mortgagee would have
to pay approximately $41,000 more to redeem, the difference between
the amounts required for statutory and equitable redemption. To require
this of him would be to allow those guilty of fraud (as the court here insists) to force an election of alternate remedies most beneficial to their
interests. The essential distinction between the case at bar and the
ordinary case of equitable redemption is this: in ordinary equitable redemption, the redemptioner is omitted from the foreclosure proceeding
v. Sandin, 371 Ill.
302, 20 N.E. (2nd) 603 (1939) merely indorsed the holdings of
Ogden v. Stevens, although, as the instant court pointed out, the facts were not
sufficient in the Woodworth case to justify statutory redemption after the statutory
period had elapsed.
14 Bridgeport Savings Bank v. Eldredge, 28 Conn. 556, 73 Am. Dec. 688 (1859);
Thompson v. Heywood, 129 Mass. 401 (1880), in which the plaintiff prayed that
defendant be ordered to assign the first mortgage to the plaintiff upon the plaintiff paying what, if anything, might be due thereon. In Hodgen v. Guttery, 58 Ill.
431 (1871), the court is talking of redemption in equity and not statutory redemption.
15 Huxley v. Rice, 40 Mich. 73 (1879) involved a violation of an agreement
between the mortgagor and the plaintiff, the foreclosing mortgagee having had
knowledge of the agreement. Empire City Savings Bank v. Silleck, 98 App. Div.
139, 90 N.Y.S. 561 (1883), was a suit instituted by a purchaser at a foreclosure
sale who wished to be relieved from completing his bid because he would not
receive a perfect title due to a jurisdictional defect in the service of process on
the second mortgagee.
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through a mistake or oversight; while in the present case the redemptioner was not made a party because of the fraudulent conduct, admitted
16
by the pleadings, of the parties to the foreclosure proceeding.
R. B. CRoss
PATENTS-INFRINGEMENT-DoEs SUPERSEDEAS BOND FURNISHED BY INFRINGER FREE ADJUDGED INFRINGING ARTICLES IN HANDS OF INFRINGER'S VENDEE.
-The United States Circuit Court for the Seventh Circuit, in Wagner Sign
Service, Inc. v. Midwest News Reel Theatres,' has determined for the
first time the question of the effect of a supersedeas bond, furnished on
appeal by an infringer of a patent pursuant to Rule 73(d) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 to stay a decree obtained against him by the
owner of the patent for an injunction and for an accounting for damages and profits arising from the infringement. It was there held that
such bond is equivalent to satisfaction of the decree, at least to the extent required to bar a subsequent recovery by the patentee against one
to whom the infringer sells an article or machine adjudged to infringe,
and who is but a mere user of such article or machine.
The plaintiff, owner of and manufacturer under a patent covering a
particular type of theatre sign, had brought the usual infringement suit
in equity against a competing manufacturer, hereinafter called "Adler,"
and had obtained in the district court an order in customary form restraining further infringement and for an accounting for damages and
profits. Adler appealed and obtained a stay of the order, furnishing a
supersedeas bond in compliance with Rule 73(d) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. While the appeal was pending, the defendant in the
instant case, an operator of a number of news reel theatres, purchased
from Adler, with full knowledge of the previous litigation, a sign of the
type adjudged to infringe plaintiff's patent. Subsequently, the order appealed from was affirmed in the respects material here, and the cause
was referred to a Special Master or a report on the accounting for
profits and damages.3 This latter proceeding is still pending. The plaintiff then brought the instant suit and obtained in the District Court a
preliminary injunction restraining the defendant from using the in16 The motion to dismiss the complaint admitted for the purpose of this decision,
that the plaintiff was deliberately omitted. Upon an answer denying such allegation the question may be differently decided.
1 112 F. (2d) 264, 49 U.S.P.Q. 287 (1941).
2 Rule 73(d). 28 U.S.C.A. following § 723(c). This rule provides in part:
"Whenever an appellant entitled thereto desires a stay on appeal, he may
present to the court for its approval a supersedeas bond which shall have
such surety or sureties as the court requires. The bond shall be conditioned for the satisfaction of the judgment in full together with costs,
interest, and damages for delay, if for any reason the appeal is dismissed
or if the judgment is affirmed, and to satisfy in full such modification of
the judgment and such costs, interest, and damages as the appellate court
may adjudge and award."
3 Adler Sign Letter Co. v. Wagner Sign Service Inc.; Wagner Sign Service Inc.
v. Ben Adler Signs, Inc., 112 F.(2d) 264, 45 U.S.P.Q. 387 (1940).
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fringing sign, which had already been installed on the marquee of one
of defendant's theatres. The Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the order
of the district court, held that the injunction had been improvidently
granted, on the grounds that defendant was but a mere user of the
sign; the plaintiff, in its successful suit against Adler, the manufacturer,
had already recovered for damages and profits including those incidental to the sale of the sign in question; and the supersedeas bond furnished by Adler assured the satisfaction of whatever judgment would be
rendered on the then pending accounting proceeding before the Special
Master. There was no showing by the plaintiff that the amount of the
bond was not sufficient to cover this particular sale in addition to others.
The decision can be best considered by a treatment, preliminarily,
of the principles governing the liability of a purchaser from an adjudged infringer, and secondly, of the effect of the supersedeas bond as
"satisfaction" of the recovery to be obtained by the plaintiff against
Adler in the previous litigation.
A number of earlier cases specifically treat the first question, and
generally support the conclusion that recovery of full compensation by
the patentee against the infringer frees the use of adjudged infringing
devices in the hands of a purchaser from the infringer. However, a large
part of the opinion of the court and of the briefs of both parties was
devoted to a discussion of an apparent conflict in the decisions including
and following the decision of the United States Supreme Court in 1884
in Birdsell v. Shaliol,4 although there is in fact a certain unanimity
among the cases antedating the Birdsell case. In that case, a patentee,
who had earlier recovered a judgment against a manufacturer and
vendor of infringing clover-hulling machines, was permitted to recover
against a purchaser of one such machine from the infringer-vendor.
Significant are the facts that the recovery against the infringer-vendor
was for one dollar, as nominal damages, which was paid, and the immediately subsequent insolvency of the infringer-vendor.
In the light of a recovery which was tantamount to no recovery in
fact, the Supreme Court used certain broad language concerning the
rights of similarly situated parties, and in the course of the opinion discussed the analogy of the case to that of a case in conversion or trespass,
where an owner has been deprived of a chattel by two other persons,
neither of whom has fully compensated the owner for his loss, the court
remarking that in a case of that kind the judgment must be satisfied
before title to the chattel can be said to have passed to the converter.
As will be observed, the analogy is not perfect, for there is in a case of
patent infringement no usurpation or passing of title to a chattel as
such. On the basis of the foregoing, Birdsell v. Shaliol can stand only
for the proposition that where a patentee has recovered but nominal
damages from an infringing manufacturer, he is not barred from pursuing his remedy against a purchaser from that manufacturer. 5
112 U.S. 485, 5 S.Ct. 244, 28 L.Ed. 768 (1884).
5 See Blake v. Greenwood Cemetery, 16 F.676 (1883).
4
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A number of important factors enter into a proper consideration of the
rights of a patentee against purchasers from an infringing manufacturer.
The most significant of these factors are: first, the extent of the patentee's first recovery; and, second, the character of the conduct of the
purchasers with respect to the devices adjudged to infringe. Hence, if
the first recovery amounts to a full compensation and includes damages and profits and other consequences of the sales by the manufacturer and of the uses by the purchasers, the patentee has obtained
a complete remedy, for, as stated in Perrigo v. Spaulding,6 the patentee
is then in the same position as he would have been had he made and
sold the device himself, and it is axiomatic that a patentee who makes
an unrestricted sale of a device covered by his patent unequivocally
frees that device from the patent. Other cases preceding Birdsell v.
Shaliol are of similar import, 7 as are a number of decisions subsequent
to the Birdsell case. 8
Certain cases decided subsequently to the Birdsell case are to the
effect that a recovery of damages from the manufacturer only will not
bar a recovery of profits from users who purchase from the manufacturer. 9 But, as will be observed, the inference is compelled that if
the recovery against the manufacturer includes the total amount of the
6 19 Fed. Cas. 260 (1376).
7 Spaulding v. Page, 22 Fed. Cas. 892 (1871); Gilbert & Barker Mfg. Co. v.
Bussing, 10 Fed. Cas. 348 (1875); Booth v. Seevers, 3 Fed. Cas. 888 (1881); Allis v.
Stowell, 16 F. 783 (1883); Steam Stone Cutter Co. v. Windsor Mfg. Co. 22 Fed. Cas.
1169 (1879); Steam Stone Cutter Co. v. Sheldons, 21 F. 875 (1884); Sickels v.
Borden, 22 Fed. Cas. 67 (1856); Emerson v. Simm, 8 Fed. Cas. 640 (1873). Birdsell
v. Shaliol overruled none of these decisions.
s In the following cases, the use of the device was freed upon the patentee's
recovery against the manufacturer, this recovery being measured in various
forms, as will be indicated:
Actual damages: Commercial Acetylene Co. v. Portable Lighting Co., 152
F. 642 (1906); Electric Gas Lighting Co. v. Wollensak, 70 F. 790 (1895);
Sutton, Steele & Steele v. Gulf Smokeless Coal Co., 6 F. Supp. 419 (1933),
modified on other grounds in 77 F.(2d) 439 (1935).
Fixed royalty or reasonable license fee: Stutz v. Armstrong, 25 F. 147
1885; Ergy Register Co. v. Standard Register Co., 23 F.(2d) 438 (1928); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.(2d) 978 (1937);
United States Frumentum Co. v. Lauhoff, 216 F. 610 (1914).
Profits and damages: Stebler v. Riverside Heights Orange Growers' Ass'n,
214 F. 550 (1914); Pomona Fruit Growers' Exchange v. Stebler, 241 F. 123
(1917); Panoualias v. National Equipment Co., 269 F. 630 (1920).
9 United States Printing Co. v. American Playing-Card Co., 70 F. 50 (1895);
Thompson v. American Bank Note Co., 35 F. 203 (1888); Philadelphia Trust, Safe
Dep. & Ins. Co. v. Edison Electric Light Co., 65 F. 551 (1895); DeLaski & Thropp
Circular Woven Tire Co. v. Empire Rubber & Tire Co., 239 F. 139 (1916);
Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Deere & Webber Co., 284 F. 331 (1922); Hazeltine Corp. v.
Atwater-Kent Mfg. Co., 34 F(2d) 50 (1929); Cf. Kryptok Co. v. Stead Lens Co.,
190 F. 767 (1911); Wilson v. Union Tool Co., 265 F. 669 (1920), affirmed on
certiorari, 259 U.S. 107, 42 S. Ct. 427, 66 L.Ed. 848 (1922); Sherman, Clay & Co.
v. Searchlight Horn Co., 225 F. 497 (1915); Wagner v. Meccano, Ltd., 239 F. 901
(1917); Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, New York, 241 F. 133 (1917), where
the suits were against retail purchasers, who stood to profit by retailing the
articles adjudged to infringe.
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profits, the user will be free from liability. A few decisions rather
pointedly conclude that recovery against the manufacturer has no effect
0
Of these,
on subsequent recovery by the patentee against the user.'
Directoplate Corporation v. Huebner-Bleistein Patents Co.," relied upon
by the plaintiff, received the consideration of the court1 2 and was disposed of on the ground that no supersedeas was involved.
13
Van Epps v. InternationalPaper Co. stands alone in its holding that
despite a prior judgment and satisfaction thereof, from the infringing
manufacturer, for damages measured by plaintiff's established license
fee, such plaintiff may proceed against a user for damages measured
by the same license fee. In short, the Van Epps case stands for double
14
However, since this case is unique in its
recovery for the patentee.
holding, it cannot be seriously considered.
On the basis of the considered cases it may be concluded that the
cases decided before and after Birdsell v. Shaliol, with the exception of
the Van Epps case, can be reasonably harmonized with each other and
with the decision in the Birdsell case. Also that, in factual situations
showing full compensation of the patentee, and use by the infringer's
vendee which use does not interfere with the patentee's monopoly, the
1
purchaser from the infringer is not liable. "

10 Directoplate Corporation v. Huebner-Bleistein Patents Co., 44 F.(2d) 783,
7 U.S.P.Q. 61 (1930); New York Filter Co. v. Schwarzwalder, 58 F. 577 (1893);
Asbestos Shingle & Sheathing Co. v. Johns-Manville Co., 189 F. 611 (1911);
Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 129 F. 213 (1904);
Tuttle v. Matthews, 28 F. 98 (1886); Compare Kelly v. Ypsilanti Dress-Stay Mfg.
Co., 44 F. 19 (1890); and Allington & Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Booth, 78 F. 878 (1897);
with Maytag Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., 35 F.(2d) 403 (1929).
11 44 F.(2d) 783, 7 U.S.P.Q. 61 (1930).
12 The Directoplate case, like others of its type, became concerned with the
particular question under consideration upon a suit by the losing infringing
manufacturer against the successful patentee for an injunction restraining the
latter from prosecuting a number of suits against the manufacturer's customers.
Thus, it may be argued that because of the unfavorable position of the plaintiff
the issue was presented in unfavorable surroundings.
13 124 F. 542 (1903).
14 In a similar aspect, defendant successfully argued that if plaintiff were
allowed to recover against Adler here, then defendant, having thus suffered
damages because of breach of the warranty of the right to use necessarily
implied in the sale of the sign by Adler to defendant, could recover over from
Adler, and Adler would suffer double liability. See Westinghouse Electric Mfg.
Co. v. Stanley Electric & Mfg. Co., 121 F. 101 (1903); and General Chemical
Co. v. Standard Wholesale Phosphate & Acid Works, Inc., 101 F.(2) 178 (1939).
See also, infra, note 16.
15 It is to be noted that what is approved here is the denial, in proper cases,
of immediate recovery by a patentee in a suit against the infringer's vendee.
It may be conceded that the patentee's abstract right to sue is not affected in
all cases. Such cases are those where the accounting by the infringer is not
completed (Directoplate Corporation v. Huebner-Bleistein Patents Co., Kelley v.
Ypsilanti Dress-Stay Mfg. Co., Allington & Curtis Mfg. Co. v. Booth, and Maytag
Co. v. Meadows Mfg. Co., supra, note 10), for it cannot be presently determined
whether the patentee is to be fully compensated by the manufacturer and it may
be necessary for the patentee to have his case at least filed against the purchaser.
See also note 18, infra.
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The importance of the requisite elements mentioned in the preceding
paragraph is brought out in the facts of the instant case, and an analysis thereof will illustrate the soundness of the decision apart from
authority. The plaintiff's business was solely that of a manufacturer and
vendor of advertising signs, and although the principal venture of the
business was in the furnishing of theatre signs, plaintiff operated no
theatres. A sign of the type considered here is a static thing and the
use of such display by the defendant was not attended with factors incident to competition with plaintiff. There was no trafficking in infringing
signs, nor was there any resale or re-use, actual or threatened, of the
sign in controversy. 16 The fact that defendant's theatre attracted patrons in huge numbers was not traceable to the infringing sign. As a
matter of fact, that particular theatre had drawn equally large audiences before the infringing sign was installed, and it is seriously doubted
whether a single patron possessed an effective like or dislike for any
particular kind of sign. In any event, plaintiff failed to show a single
lost sale, and its attempt to show that the conduct of the defendent and
of Adler resulted in damage to the plaintiff in that such conduct indicated
to the public that plaintiff's patent was being and could continue to be
ignored in a "notorious, flagrant and challenging" manner, was rejected
by the court as speculative and as insufficient reason to grant plaintiff
either pecuniary or injunctive relief.
Having applied the principles of the discussed cases in the instant
situation, the consideration of the supersedeas bond under Rule 73(d)
becomes but a recognition of the terms and spirit of the rule. The
language of the rule is plain: "The bond shall be conditioned for the
satisfaction of the judgment in full." Plaintiff urged that the only effect
of the supersedeas bond was to save Adler from the pains of punishment for contempt if the infringing device was sold pending appeal.
This position the court held untenable, for although a supersedeas without bond might have this limited effect, the presence of the bond is an
assurance that plaintiff, if successful (as he was) against Adler, would
be fully compensated for all damages and profits occasioned by Adler's
manufacture and sale of infringing signs until the time of the final accounting. Moreover, the sale of the sign to the defendant was, in the
nature of things, made with the sanction of the court in the Adler case,
for the stay on appeal in effect gave Adler the right to make the sale,
which carried with it the right of use by a purchaser. In this respect it
is to be noted that the purchase by defendant pending the appeal, during
which the injunction was stayed by the supersedeas bond, was not
materially different from a purchase made before the Adler litigation
had even begun. And this also effectively disposes of plaintiff's contention that the position of the court on this point amounted to construing the supersedeas bond as a license to Adler to make and sell infringing devices, for, as has already been pointed out, the Adler in16 Compare those cases, supra, note 9, where the patentee was permitted
recovery because the defendant-purchasers were retailers and stood to increase
their own profits and the patentee's damages.
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that in which,
junction was superseded and the situation was temporarily
7
practicably speaking, no injunction had issued.'
In a final aspect of the case, plaintiff made a conditional offer to
waive damages against Adler as to the sign in controversy if it could
have its recovery against defendant here. This offer was rejected on
the ground that plaintiff had made an election to obtain a decree against
Adler for damages and profits arising from all sales, including the sale
to defendant, and that the record disclosed only such decree and no
other.1 8
Upon well reasoned principles and the most persuasive authority,
the rule laid down by the court cannot be seriously disputed. The doctrine that recovery of full compensation by a patentee against an infringing manufacturer frees the use of infringing articles in the hands
of a purchaser from that manufacturer, is salutary and practicable and
-is capable of intelligent and just application in those cases in which
the use of the device by infringer's vendee is a mere use as distinguished
from a use which proximately provides the user with a source of profit
or which seriously interferes with the business of the patentee. The establishment of the effect of the supersedeas bond as the equivalent of,
or as assuring, the satisfaction of the judgment or decree against the
manufacturing infringer seems plainly within the intent of Rule 73(d).
Moreover, the attributing of this effect to the supersedeas bond renders
unimportant the broad effect given to such cases as Birdsell v. Shaliol,
for now the patentee receives the equivalent of full satisfaction.
H. M. KNomrH
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIoN-FuLL FAITH AND CREDIT-APPLIATION OF THE

COMPENSATION LAW OF THE FORUM WHERE THE INJURY Is
AND THE CONTRACT OF HmIE Is CONSUMMATED IN A
SUSTAINED TnE~mu
FOREIGN STATE.-The sole circumstance that an industrial accident occurs
in Illinois does not constitute a sufficient interest to warrant the application of the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act where the contract of
employment was consummated in a foreign state. The effect of the recent decision in the case of Miller v. Yellow Cab Company' is to reaffirm
WORKMEN'S

17 Whatever the nature of the effect of the supersedeas, the court found it
unnecessary to decide, and the point is believed immaterial here. Certain it is
that the stay did not constitute a license. Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co. v. Goshen
Sweeper Co., 72 F. 545 (1896); Meccano, Ltd. v. John Wanamaker, 241 F. 133
(1917); Wagner et al v. Meccano, Ltd., 239 F. 901 (1917).
18 The court admitted that if, in the accounting proceeding pending in the
Adler litigation, the plaintiff succeeded in its waiver or otherwise failed to be
compensated by Adler for damages and profits incidental to the particular
sign in question, a different situation would be presented. However, in view of
the conclusion that the supersedeas bond assured full satisfaction, the question
was at present immaterial. Here again it will be seen that the patentee's abstract
right to maintain the suit cannot always be denied; although, it is apparent that
his recovery against the infringer's vendee should be held in abeyance at least
until it is determined whether the infringer will be called to account. See also
note 15, supra.
1 308 Ill. App. 217, 31 N.E. (2d) 406 (1941).
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this fact, and further, to declare that there is no Illinois public policy
which compels the application of its own compensation law under these
circumstances.
The plaintiff in the instant case was an employee of Sears Roebuck
& Co., a New York Corporation. While a resident of Texas he made the
contract of employment in that state, to be fully performed there,
whereby he undertook to manage the store of his employer at San Antonio, Texas. Both the employer and employee were operating under
and subject to the provisions of the Texas Workmen's Compensation
Law. In addition, the employer was also operating under the Illinois
compensation law with respect to its Illinois operations and the defendant
was likewise subject to the Illinois compensation law. The plaintiff came
to Chicago intending to consult with officials of his company concerning
matters dealing with the management of the store, and while a passenger
in a taxi of the defendant corporation, a collision occurred between the.
taxi and another automobile resulting in injuries to the plaintiff. Admittedly, the accident arose out of and in the course of the plaintiff's employment.
The Texas compensation law specifically provided for its extra-territorial application, 2 this being a valid provision of such a statute, 3 and
accordingly, compensation was awarded to the plaintiff upon his filing
a claim under the Texas law. Subsequently, he brought a civil action
against the Yellow Cab Company in the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Illinois, alleging the negligent operation of the taxi. The defendant's
answer, in addition to other defenses, set up the fact that Sears Roebuck & Co. was operating under the provisions of the Illinois compensation act and by operation of that law all employees of the corporation,
who had not elected not to be bound, were also subject to the same law.
It was set forth that the plaintiff had a right to obtain compensation
under the Illinois statute because the injury was sustained in this state.
This statute provides that when an employee is injured under circum2 Title 130, Vernon's Texas Statutes, 1936 Art. 8306, § 19. A majority of the
workmen's compensation laws specifically provide for their extra-territorial
application, while other statutes, by judicial construction, have been given this
effect. However, such extra-state effect is subjected in many instances to qualifications and restrictions which make it essential to analyze the statutes and
the judicial decisions, in order to determine the extent to which a particular
state applies its statute beyond its territorial jurisdiction.
3 Beall Bros. Supply Co. v. Ind. Com., 341 Ill. 193, 173 N.E. 64 (1930); Johnston
v. Ind. Com., 352 Ill. 74, 185 N.E. 191 (1933); Hagenback v. Leppert, 66 Ind. App.
261, 117 N.E. 531 (1917); Rounsaville v. Central Railway Co., 87 N.J.L. 371, 94
AUt. 392 (1915); Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 At. 372
(1915); Post v. Burger, 216 N.Y. 544, 111 N.E. 351 (1916); Krekelberg v. Floyd
Co., 166 Minn. 163, 207 N.W. 193 (1926); Gulf Casualty Co. v. Fields, 107 S.W.(2d)
661 (1937); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Brown, 110 S.W.(2d) 130 (1937); Sloan v.
Appalachian Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 108 (1939). The theory of extra-territorial
application is that when the contract of hire is consummated within the state,
the incident of compensation benefits becomes annexed to the contract and
operates as a material provision of that contract, regardless of the time or place
of performance.
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stances creating liability for damages on the part of a third party, such
third party also being subject to the act, then the injured employee's
right of action is transferred to his employer and damages are limited
to the payments which the employer is required to make under the
compensation act. 4 As this section of the law has been construed to bar
an action by the employee against the tort feasor,5 the defendant set
up this disability in defense. Judgment for the defendant was rendered
on the pleadings and an appeal was prosecuted to the appellate court
which reversed the ruling of the trial court and remanded the case with
directions, holding that the plaintiff was not subject to the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, and that he had a right of action against the
defendant under the Texas law which permits an injured employee to
sue a negligent party causing the injury.6
There is some contrariety in the decisions as to whether the local law
of the forum, which is also the place of the injury, or whether the lex loci
contractus should be applied under circumstances similar to those prevailing in this case, 7 the majority of the jurisdictions holding that the
latter law is applicable. There is authority for the proposition that a
competent court in the state where the contract of hire was concluded,
having in personam jurisdiction, could enjoin an employee who proceeds
with a claim for compensation under the laws of the foreign state.8
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court in the case of Bradford
Electric Light Co. v. Clapper,9 has definitely ruled that where a state
compensation law provides for the employee's exclusive remedy and for
its extra-territorial application, a foreign state must extend full faith and
credit to that law, despite the occurrence of the wrong in the foreign
state. In the case of Cole v. Industrial Commission,10 the court held that
the Illinois Industrial Commission had no jurisdiction in a case involving
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, Sec. 166. This portion of the Illinois statute is
unique and no similar provision, whereby an injured employee's right of action
against a third party also operating under the act is transferred to his employer
and recovery is limited to the payments prescribed by the act, will be found in
any other workmen's compentation law.
5 Parker v. Alton R. Co., 295 Ill. App. 60, 14 N.E.(2d) 665 (1938); Brennan
Const. Co. v. Blair, 261 Ill. App. 9 (1931); Goldsmith v. Payne, 300 IMI. 119, 133
N.E. 52 (1921); McNaught v. Hines, 300 Ill. 167, 133 N.E. 53 (1921); Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co. v. Chicago Rys. Co., 307 Ill. 322, 138 N.E. 658 (1923).
6 Title 130, Vernon's Texas Statutes, 1936 Art. 8307, Sec. 6a.
7 Hall v. Industrial Commission, 77 Colo. 338, 235 P. 1073 (1925); Cole v.
Industrial Commission, 353 Ill. 415, 187 N.E. 520 (1933); Barnhart v. American
Concrete Steel Co., 227 N.Y. 531, 125 N.E. 675 (1920); Proper v. Polley, 233 App.
Div. 631, 253 N.Y.S. 530 (1931). These cases hold that the compensation law of the
forum does not apply to an injury within the state, where the employment was
in another state. The contrary view is held in the following cases: Pacific
Employers Inc. Co. v. Ind. Acci. Com., 306 U.S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629, 83 L.Ed. 940
(1939); Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 289 U.S. 439, 53 S. Ct. 663, 77
L.Ed. 1307 (1933); Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 119 Me. 552, 112 A. 516 (1921).
s Weiderhoff v. Neal, 6 F. Supp. 798 (1934); Bradford Electric Light Co. v.
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 52 S. Ct. 571, 76 L.Ed. 1026 (1932).
9 286 U.S. 145, 52 S. Ct. 571, 76 L.Ed. 1026 (1932).
10 353 Ill. 415, 187 N.E. 520 (1933).

400

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

an injury sustained by an Indiana resident, employed under an Indiana
resident, employed under an Indiana contract of hire, where the employee was injured while temporarily working in Illinois. The court clearly stated that full faith and credit must be given the Indiana statute,
which provided for its extra-state application, and relied on the authority
of the Clapper case for its decision. This was the first decision of the
Illinois court with respect to this particular problem and no occasion
arose to re-examine this exact question until the decision in the case of
Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Service," where similar circumstances produced
a like result. The instant case reasserts that the Illinois Workmen's
Compensation Act is not applicable where the lex loci contractus provides for extra-territorial effect, and the employee is but temporarily in
this state when the injury is sustained.
The requirement that full faith and credit be extended to a foreign
statute is subject to the limitation that if there is extant a public policy
in opposition to the foreign statute, then the forum is not compelled to
subordinate its own law. Some states have adopted a public policy which
requires the application of their own compensation laws when an employee is injured within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, even
though the law of the state where the employment contract was made
provides for extra-state coverage. In the case of the Pacific Employers
Insurance Co. v. Industrial Commission,12 wherein a Massachusetts resident, employed under a Massachusetts contract, sustained an injury
while temporarily in California, the United States Supreme Court sustained the judgment of the California court in applying the California
compensation law. This decision was predicated on the declared public
policy of California to apply its compensation law where an employee is
injured in that state, regardless of the lex loci contractus. This declaration of public policy was promulgated by the California court in construing its own constitution and statute which specifically provided that
its compensation law applied to all injuries which occur within its borders, despite any contract between the employer and the employee
which provides to the contrary. 13 Other states have incorporated similar
provisions in their statutes. 14 Thus, there is no conflict in the opinions
11 374 Ill. 506, 30 N.E.(2d) 14 (1940).
12 306 U.S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629, 83 L.Ed. 940 (1939).
13 California Construction of 1879, Art. XX, § 21, vests the legislature with
plenary power "to create and enforce a complete system of workmen's compensation," including "adequate provisions for the comfort, health and safety
and general welfare . . ." § 27 (a) of the California Workmen's Compensation,
Insurance and Safety Act, Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering 1931) Act 4749, provides that
"No contract, rule, or regulation shall exempt the employer from liability for
the compensation fixed by this act."
14 The Delaware Compensation Law provides, "This Chapter shall be called and
cited as 'The Delaware Workmen's Compensation Law of 1917' and shall apply
to all accidents occurring within this State, irrespective of the place where the
contract of hiring was made, renewed or extended .. " Missouri provides, "This
chapter shall apply to all injuries received in this state, regardless of where
the contract of employment was made .. " Nevada has a provision peculiar to
that state wherein it is provided that "any employer of labor in the State of
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expressed in the California case and the Clapper case, because in the
latter case neither the New Hampshire court nor the New Hampshire
statute declared the existence of a public policy requiring the application of its own law.
A refusal to extend full faith and credit to a compensation law providing extra-territorial effect, on the grounds of an opposing public policy
seems to be an unreasonable expansion of that doctrine, particularly in
those cases wherein the only real interest of the forum is the fact of the
accident occurring within its territory. Additional and more substantial
contacts in a particular case would undoubtedly constitute a rational
basis for applying the lex fori.
All of the cases decided by the Illinois court on this point have involved
circumstances wherein the employee was a non-resident and but temporarily in Illinois when his injury was sustained. The instant case invites
consideration as to what the attitude of the Illinois court would be if
there were additional contacts enlarging the interest of the state, though
the contract of hire was made elsewhere. A strict compliance with the
rule that the lex loci contractus attaches where an injury is sustained
in this state certainly would not produce a salutary situation. Assuming
the additional factor that the employee is domiciled in Illinois, does it
seem probable that the Illinois Court would refuse to apply its compensation act and thereby compel a resident of this state to go to a
distant state in order to enforce a claim for compensation? Other factors
which would enlarge the governmental interest of this state establishing
a sufficient basis for the application of the Illinois law would be the
fact that the contract of employment was to be fully performed here,
and that the particular employment was incidental to and associated
with a business localized in Illinois. It would seen that any one of these
factors, or a combination of them, coupled with the fact that the accident occurred here, might well justify the acceptance of jurisdiction.
Particularly is this true in the case of an Illinois resident when consideration is given the expressed purpose of the act as set forth in the
title.15 It will be observed that the act purports to apply specifically
Nevada and any employee thereof, whether hired in or out of the state and
whose duties may be partially or wholly out of the state, may, by their joint
election, elect to come under the provisions of this act in the manner following:
. . . After such joint election is made, any employee who receives personal
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of such employment shall
be entitled to receive compensation according to the provisions of this act, even
though he was hired outside of this state and received such injury outside of this
state." The New Hampshire Workmen's Compensation Law formerly contained
a provision that its law applied to workmen within that state irrespective of
the place where the contract of hire was made, but by amendment effective
July 1, 1939, this section of the law was omitted.
15 "An Act to promote the general welfare of the people of this State by providing compensation for accidental injuries or death suffered in the course of
employment within this State, and without this State where the contract of employment is made within this State; providing for the enforcement and administering thereof .. " Laws 1925, p. 378. (Preamble of Workmen's Compensation Act,
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 48, §§ 138-186.)

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

to the people of the state of Illinois, and the granting of compensation,
despite the fact that the contract of hire was entered into in a foreign
state, would not violate the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution
because the act can be rationally construed as an expression of public
policy with respect to injuries sustained by its residents while in the
course of their employment.
The courts of other states have refused to apply their compensation
laws, despite an extra-territorial provision, and have ruled that the lex
loci contractus does not apply when the employment outside the state is
not incidental to operations conducted within the state, or where the
contract is to be fully performed without the state. 16 Thus, it is readily
apparent that an impass6 would develop whereby an injured employee
would be denied a remedy under the law of the state where the contract
was made, and he would likewise be denied a remedy under the Illinois
law, unless rational limitations were placed upon application of the rule
announced in the instant case. The lack of uniformity in extra-territorial
provisions, many states having limitations and restrictions which are
peculiar to their own statutes, 17 is a factor to be considered against a
16 Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., 252 N.Y. 394,

169 N.E. 622 (1930).

This

case involved an employment contract made in New York with performance
to be made in Canada by the employee, his work being incidental to a road
construction job being performed in New York. The court, in refusing to apply
its compensation law, said, "Nothing in the statute suggests that the state of
New York has attempted to stretch forth its arm to draw within the scope of
its own regulations the relations of employer and employee in work conducted
beyond its borders. Hazardous employment here is regulated by the Workmen's
Compensation Law; hazardous employment elsewhere, though connected with
a business conducted here, does not come within its scope ...
"When the course of employment requires the workman to perform work beyond the borders of the state, a close question may at times be presented as to
whether the employment itself is located here. Determination of that question
may at times depend upon the relative weight to be given under all the circumstances to opposing considerations. The facts in each case, rather than juristic
concepts, will govern such determination. Occasional transitory work beyond the
state may reasonably be said to be work performed in the course of employment
here; employment confined to work at a fixed place in another state is not
employment within the state, for this state is concerned only remotely, if at all,
with the conditions of such employment."
17 There is a seemingly inexplicable variance in the extra-territorial provisions
of the compensation acts of those states which have specifically provided for such
application. The statutes of Colorado, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming make no specific mention of the extra-territorial application of
their respective laws, but the courts in all of these states have determined that
such effect shall be given to their respective statutes under the particular circumstances of the individual cases presented for adjudication. Those states
which have extra-territorial statutes may be classified satisfactorily into several
groups, but some statutes do not bear classification because of their unique
character. In this category are Maryland, Massachusetts, and Oregon. The
statutes of Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Nebraska, Ohio,
South Dakota, Utah, and Vermont provide that their laws shall apply to injuries
sustained outside the state where the contract of hire was made within the
state, without any specific limitation on their application. Alabama, Kansas,

DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS

blind adherence to the rule which requires enforcement of the lex loci
contractus. The restrictions, which have been referred to, will provoke
numerous factual problems in the process of determining whether the
extra-territorial provision of a law will be enforced by an enacting state
in a particular case. It is readily conceivable that if a decision adverse
to the employee is rendered in that state, a sufficient period of time
would have elapsed to prevent the employee's making claim in Illinois
because of the Illinois statute of limitations, which requires the claim
to be filed with the Industrial Commission within one year after the date
of the injury.
In the last analysis, it is desirable that careful consideration be given
the circumstances of each case and if facts are present which create
a substantial Illinois interest, then Illinois would be warranted in a refusal to subordinate its own statute. There can be no criticism of the
decision in the instant case as it is fundamentally sound in principle,
the only danger being the adoption of a policy extending the rule beyond
the limited circumstances of the case.
L. B. MARsHALL
Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee provide for an extra-territorial effect unless
the contract of employment otherwise specifically provides. Michigan and California provide that the employee must be a resident of the state, and Florida,
Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia add to this element of
residence the requirements that the employer's place of business must be within
the state and that the contract was not for services to be performed exclusively
outside the state. Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Texas provide for a time limitation within which the injury must be sustained in order for the extra-territorial
provision to be operative.

